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Abstract 
Confining the focus to individual enterprise, 
traditional risk management literature seems to echo 
inadequately in the context of collaborative supply 
chain, partially due to its exclusion of correlation of 
risks across companies. In this study, we refine the 
notion of risk in supply chain and propose a model of 
supply chain risk system (SCRS) that consciously 
takes into account the correlation among risks 
resulting from partners’ collaboration. Through 
analytical inference we found that the level of 
collaboration contributes to the resilience of supply 
chain. It implies that collaboration can positively 
affect the topology of SCRS, thus benefiting supply 
chain operations in terms of risk management. A 
simulation program has been developed with aim to 
demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed 
model. Implemented in simulation, two sets of 
experiments have been conducted for testing the 
model in actual business scenarios. The experimental 
results provide supporting evidence to consolidate 
the analytical findings. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The first decade of 21st century has witnessed the 
dramatic growth of supply chain in which a 
consolidating linkage through a series of processes, 
from raw material preparation to manufacturing, 
transportation, storage, and eventually to delivery of 
services or products to the end consumers, ties up the 
parties involved with an interest chain so close that 
supply chain companies are correlated in success and 
failure in some sense [1]. In such highly interactive 
business model, the relationship among the parties is 
rather delicate. Despite conflicts surely existing, 
every now and then companies in supply chain are 
inclined to collaborate with each other albeit it is for 
their own sake, e.g. for financial robustness, strategic 
advancement or operational excellence [2]. As 
collaboration goes along, companies may benefit 
from working with each other. They may seek to 
expand their collaboration both in breadth and in 
depth, and hence “partnership”, a much more closed 
interorganizational relationship, will be established, 
in which partners are coordinated to behave as a 
whole and they share not only their profits but also 
the risks [3]. The impact of partnership is 
tremendous. The literature has shown a great amount 
of evidence that it is a critical driving force towards 
an effective supply chain [4, 5]. While most of 
studies are focusing on the direct impact of 
partnership upon the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the supply chain performance, little attention is paid 
on the issues of supply chain risks emerging due to 
such intimate relationship [6]. In fact, under 
partnership the risk of an individual company is not 
just the risk of itself and it actually the risk of all the 
partners. For instance, if the upstream supplier broke 
down because of a strike occurring in workplace, it 
would probably jeopardize the operations of the 
manufacturer in the middle stream and further affect 
the sales of the retailers in the downstream. In other 
words, the risk of a company is no longer limited 
within the boundary of enterprise. Partnership has 
been expanding the scope of risk management from 
the enterprise level to the supply chain level. Such a 
significant change upon risk management under the 
effect of partnership, we believe, is truly worth to be 
investigated.  
Given the context of collaborative supply chain, 
risks among partners are linked with each other, 
which however is seldom considered in traditional 
risk management research. In attempt to echo the 
correlation of risks resulting from the effect of 
partnership and to construct more accurate notion 
upon supply chain risks, this paper draws from the 
theories of system science and the literatures of risk 
management to propose a model of supply chain risk 
system (SCRS). SCRS organizes supply chain risks 
in a visual network according to their causal 
relationships and reflects the partnership effect 
delicately by the topological distribution of risk 
nodes and the chain influencing process. Through 
modeling and simulation, our analysis on SCRS 
reveals that the partners’ collaboration can 
significantly contribute to the resilience of supply 
chain. This offers a novel explanation from the 
perspective of risk management for why nowadays 
increasing number of companies is consciously 
engaged in partnership in supply chain.  The rest of 
this paper is organized as follows: section 2 is 
devoted to the literature review on supply chain risk 
management, with intention to identify the key issues 
as well as the research gap in the existing literature. 
In section 3, the proposed model of SCRS is 
presented and the impact of partnership upon supply 
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chain in terms of topological structure of SCRS is 
analyzed through analytical inference. The 
verification experiments and the related results are 
disclosed in section 4. The main conclusions of the 
paper are summarized in section 5. 
 
2. Managing risks in supply chain: major 
issues in the literature 
 
Today, managing risks within the enterprise 
boundary is far from enough [7]. Companies begin to 
notice that a number of risks impacting upon them 
may not exist in the companies but come from their 
supply chain partners. Therefore, while continuously 
improving ERM (enterprise risk management) within 
the companies, they gradually pay more attention 
upon the risks in supply chain.  Supply chain risk 
management (SCRM), compared to ERM, no doubt 
is a relatively new discipline. SCRM is more 
interested in the coordination and collaboration of 
processes and activities across functions within a 
network of companies, with an intention to ensure 
that the supply chain is performing effectively and 
efficiently as normal [8]. To copy with the 
uncertainty from the supply side and the demand 
side, upstream risk management and downstream risk 
management have emerged, forming two major 
research areas in SCRM.  
Regarding upstream risk management, the main 
issues include supply network design, supplier 
relationship management, supplier order allocation 
and contract management. Helper (1991) reported 
that supplier relationship in U.S. has experienced a 
great shift from a common market transaction 
relationship to a long-term cooperative partnership in 
1990s [9]. Dyer and Ouchi (1996) confirmed the 
similar situation happed in Japan also [10]. Spekman 
and Davis (2004) pointed out that interdependency 
resulting from partnership is the main source of risks 
in the supply side, but it is not unmanageable [11]. 
Zsidisn (2003) provided some useful suggestions to 
mitigate the upstream risks, including: 1) establishing 
buffer stock and enhancing inventory management; 
2) avoiding single sourcing and using alternative 
sources of supply; 3) utilizing supply contracts to 
manage the fluctuation in sourcing price; and 4) 
adopting quality initiatives to implement 
comprehensive quality management [12].  
Normally in supply chain, the supply capacity is 
fixed in most cases whereas the demand is changing 
all the time. Given that, companies are required to 
apply various downstream risk management 
strategies to lower the probability of mismatch 
between the static constant supply and the dynamic 
uncertain demand. The literature is abundant in this 
area. Carr and Lovejoy (2000) developed a 
mathematical model to identify an optimal portfolio 
of demand distributions [13], and Van Mieghem and 
Dada (2001) from an economic view made an in-
depth analysis on how to through dynamic pricing 
make an appropriate response to the unstable demand 
[14]. Regarding the phenomena that companies set 
different price at different time, the literature 
explained this as a strategy of risk mitigation. Pricing 
higher in peak seasons is actually to shift demand to 
off seasons rather than to grasp high profit margin 
from the customers [15]. It is found that the pricing 
mechanism is not only able to shift the demand 
across the time but also to shift the demand across the 
products. Chod and Rudi (2005) showed us a vivid 
case in which a higher profit can be obtained through 
adopting differential pricing strategy to entice 
customers to shift the demand from one product to 
another [16]. 
In the context of supply chain, physical 
experimentations, suffering from technical and cost 
related limitations, are difficult to implement in risk 
research [17]. Simulation is considered to be an 
effective method to model and analyze risk cases of 
large scale. There are a number of good studies of 
SCRM using simulation in the literature. E.g. 
Swaminathan et al (1998). It adopted agent-based 
simulation to model supply chain dynamics and 
provided a rapid decision supporting tool for risk 
management [18]. Deleris and Erhun (2005) 
presented in their paper a Monte Carlo simulation 
with which different levels of risks in supply chain 
can be analyzed sophisticatedly [19] . Jain and Leong 
(2005) viewed supply chain as a complex system and 
demonstrated the advantages of constructing supply 
chain simulations to “stress test” the system and 
investigate its performance under risk situations [20].  
After a brief literature review above, we are 
aware that the previous literature more or less has 
propensity to focus SCRM upon discrete sectors, 
mainly confined in either upstream or downstream 
risk management. Most of research is concentrating 
upon solely one area, and there are few studies that 
provide an integrated view of the whole supply chain 
from risk management perspective. Furthermore, the 
correlation among the risks of the partners is few 
discussed in the literature. Such gap provides a good 
research opportunity for our study. One of the goals 
of this research is to bridge this gap through 
investigating supply chain risks as a system and 
reflecting the correlation effect among the risks in 
supply chain. Considering the scale as well as the 
constraints of this study, simulation is chosen as the 
research methodology, for its fitness to SCRM 
studies suggested by the literature.  
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3. Conceptual development and model 
building 
 
3.1. Modeling individual supply chain risk 
 
What is a risk? How to conceptualize it? Those 
are the fundamental problems every study of risk has 
to confront. Although countless answers subjected to 
various perceptions are conferred by the literature, 
their essence is never out of the below four 
interpretations, including viewing risk as hazard [21], 
as probability [22], as consequence [23], and as 
potential adversity or threat [24] . 
No matter hazard, probability or potential threat, 
they emphasized that risk should be uncertain, which 
will happen some time and will not happen other 
time. It is believed that there exists a law of 
probability governing its occurrence [25]. Once a risk 
occurs, it will result in some negative consequence, 
such as hazard or adversity. Most of the times, the 
reasons behind causing the risk are attracting 
people’s attention, and people are unstoppably trying 
every means to seek for the origin of the risk. But it 
at the end always turns out to be a tantalizing 
conundrum when traced back to the root of the 
reasons of the reasons. The origin seems like a black 
box unknown or too complicated to be known for 
people, thus scholars give it a name “uncertainty”. 
Although there used to be a period in which academia 
was confused by “does uncertain produce risk or risk 
begets uncertain?”, nowadays scholars have reached 
a consensus that it is uncertainty that leads to risk 
[22]. 
The discussion above uncovers an important 
fact that risk is not a simple object, in other words, it 
is a system made up of components [26]. Kaplan 
(1997) proposed that risk can be expressed by a 
triplet with the combination of scenario, probability 
and consequence[27]. Inheriting the similar idea, we 
believe that risk at least comprises three essential 
parts: 1) the drivers that generate the risk; 2) an event 
with probability that signifies the occurrence of risk; 
and 3) the consequence brought by the risk. By 
taking into account the three essential components of 
risk and incorporating the conception of correlation 
among risks, we propose a model named Risk with 
Casual Relationship (RCR) to depict an individual 
risk. It is visualized in Fig.1. 
 
 
Fig.1 A model of Risk with Causal Relationship (RCR) 
 
The model RCR provides an understanding of 
risk with causal relationship. It portrays the process 
of causation rather than giving a static definition of 
an individual risk. Keeping in line with traditional 
interpretations of risk, RCR involves “drivers”, 
“event” and “consequences” in the conception. It 
conceptualizes risk as an event that occurs in 
probability, which is denoted as a circle in the middle 
(See Fig.1). However, an isolated circle itself cannot 
be called risk. It is qualified as a true risk only and 
only if it happens with reasons (those refer to drivers) 
and consequences (the consequences should be 
negative). Thereby, to identify a risk, we cannot 
make judgment sheer based on whether it is an event 
with probability only. Like a customer visiting a 
supermarket, nobody will treat it as a risk despite that 
it happens stochastically. A true risk is able to cause 
negative consequences. Moreover, the occurrence of 
such event requires drivers which are the antecedents 
that cause the risk. Aware of the correlation among 
the risks, we infer that the antecedents should not 
include just the factors that lead to the risk event, and 
it is also possible that some risks which happened 
antecedently would trigger a ripple effect and drive 
other risk event to happen. Given that, drivers we 
propose can be factors or risks: 
Driver (D) = Factor (F) | Risk (R) 
 
Factors in RCR mainly refer to the causes 
uncontrollable or immeasurable. They can be 
perceived abstractly, and it is difficult to confirm 
their occurrence with a specific indicator. The major 
difference between a factor and a commencing risk 
lies in that a commencing risk happens in probability 
while a factor is similar to uncertainty that is nearly 
impossible to quantified, and even though it can be 
quantified to some extent, it nearly cannot be 
changed. A typical example for “factor” is political 
climate. Political climate or political situation is 
uncontrollable to supply chain companies, and an 
unstable political situation is able to trigger a number 
of risks, e.g. a strike risk in the manufacturing site, 
which may cause serious disruption in supply chain. 
Nevertheless, companies can do very little to political 
situation, and in most cases they have to accept the 
factor and adapt to the situation. 
Consequences in RCR are referred to the 
negative result of a risk. They can be a direct harmful 
impact quantified financially or another consequent 
risks being triggered which may cause other bigger 
loss in the later time: 
Consequence (C) = Impact (I) | Risk (R) 
 
Impacts in RCR are referred to the ultimate and 
specific loss resulting from the risk, which can be 
measured quantitatively.  
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In a short summary, RCR defines risk as a 
stochastic event with causes and effects. The 
occurrence of such event requires drivers which can 
be some factors or commencing risks. When the 
drivers are active (or say the conditions to trigger the 
risk event are satisfied), it does not mean the risk will 
happen definitely but just implies that the probability 
of risk to occur is extremely high. Some risks may 
cause economical damage in a direct manner while 
others may result in tremendous harms indirectly 
through triggering other risks in a consequence.  
 
3.2. Modeling supply chain risk system 
 
When we link up the risks according to their 
causal relationships, those will constitute a great 
network with intensive connections among the items 
in it. Fig 2 illustrates a visualized picture of this 
network for us. 
 Fig.2 Risk Causality Network (RCN) 
 
Excluding the factor nodes as well as the impact 
nodes, the region inside the dash line composes a risk 
causality network (RCN). RCN is constructed on the 
basis of a number of individual risks under the model 
of RCR. To secure the causality in between, we 
suggest that the risks involved be at the same level. 
Up to specific application, RCN can be aggregated to 
a more strategic level or be drilled down to a more 
operational level. In fact, its organization is not 
arbitrary and there are 3 rules, we are aware of, 
governing the construction of RCN:  
1. The initial risk node in RCN must be triggered 
solely by factor(s); 
2. The RCN should end with the risk nodes that 
result in negative impacts only. 
3. The causality among risks implies the time 
sequence, and thereby the antecedent risk must 
happen before the triggered risk. The property 
of time sequence determines that the RCN must 
be an acyclic graph. 
 
RCR and RCN are two fundamental concepts 
that assist us in modeling risks in supply chain. 
Though conceived in a general level that ignored the 
application context, they have been conceptualized 
with the key features of supply chain risks. The 
correlation of risks in supply chain is reflected fully 
in the casual relationship both in RCR and in RCN. 
RCR provides an appropriate template for supply 
chain risks modeling, and supply chain risks can 
easily be specified following the conception of RCR. 
TABLE 1 shows a list of supply chain risks in the 
process of sourcing. It demonstrates a well fitness of 
applying RCR in the context of supply chain. 
Similarly, the supply chain risk system (SCRS) can 
be engendered by a specific application of RCN in 
supply chain (Please see Fig. 3). 
              TABLE 1 
                   A List of Supply Chain Risks in the Process of Sourcing 
Risk Name Drivers Event Indicator Consequences 
Supply 
disruption 
risk 
[28, 29] 
- Unstable political 
climate(F) 
- Payment delay (R) 
Supplier terminates 
the supply 
- Damaging the 
trust in 
partnership (I) 
Supplier 
commitment 
risk 
[28, 29] 
- Competitor seducing 
supplier to jump out of 
the contract (F) 
- Supply disruption 
risk (R) 
- Payment delay (R) 
Supplier terminates 
the supply contract 
- Manufacturing 
stoppage risk (R) 
- Material 
inventory 
shortage risk (R) 
Long lead 
time risk 
[12, 30] 
- Supplier 
transportation risk (R) 
- Offshore 
procurement risk (R) 
The lead time runs 
out of the safety 
range 
- Material 
inventory 
shortage risk (R) 
- Manufacturing 
stoppage risk (R) 
Material 
inventory 
shortage risk 
[12, 30] 
- Long lead time risk 
(R) 
 
The material 
inventory level is 
lower than the 
safety stock level 
Manufacturing 
stoppage risk (R) 
Payment 
delay 
[30, 31] 
- Cash in short (F) 
- Problems with the 
accounting system (F) 
Late pay to the 
supplier 
- Supply 
disruption 
risk(R) 
- Damaging the 
trust in 
partnership (I) 
Offshore 
procurement 
risk [31] 
- Low cost of 
procurement (F) 
Purchase the raw 
material from 
offshore suppliers 
- Long lead time 
risk (R) 
Note: F: factor; R: risk; I: impact  
               Fig.3 Supply Chain Risk System (SCRS)  
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In SCRS, risk nodes are connected according to 
their casual relationship in a network structure. The 
initial nodes are normally triggered by some 
unpredictable environmental factors. For example, 
severe fluctuation in raw material price may cause 
flawed co-forecasting risk in supply, and it may 
trigger inventory risk if the price is so high that the 
manufacturer is not able to afford the high price and 
thus have to shrink the import quota of inventory. 
The shortage in inventory may cause some bigger 
problem if it cannot be fixed appropriately, one such 
like manufacturing stoppage that can result in 
appalling disruption of the whole supply chain. 
Actually the state of each supply chain risk node 
at a time is determined by two factors: its marginal 
probability and its correlation with other risk nodes. 
Given that, the state of SCRS can be presented in a 
form of a set with the time property:  
RSt tijcorrip },{=  ………………………….(1) 
Where RSt denotes the state of SCRS at time t, pi is 
marginal probability of a risk node i, and corrij is the 
causal correlation between risk node i and j. 
pi measures how likely the individual risk would 
happen, and corrij not only reflects the relationship 
between nodes but also determines the topological 
structure of SCRS. Both pi and corrij can be obtained 
from the historical data stored in enterprise data 
warehouse. But if the data is unavailable in the 
database, it can be estimated or suggested by the 
experts in the filed of SCRM. RSt would vary at 
different time t in terms of the layout structure or the 
risk likelihoods in SCRS. It can be influenced by lots 
of factors, such as economic climate, industrial 
practices or partnership (See Fig.3.). In this study, we 
would like to investigate how partnership impacts on 
the topological structure of SCRS.  
 
3.3. Measuring resilience of supply chain 
risk system 
 
Vulnerability is an opposite concept against 
responsiveness and it is used to describe a supply 
chain in lack of robustness and resilience with respect 
to various risks that imposes negative impact upon 
supply chain [32, 33]. Robustness and resilience are 
two key concepts in SCRM. To large extent, they 
indicate the performance of risk management in 
supply chain. Robustness of supply chain is referred 
to the ability of supply chain to resist the impact of 
risk and retain the same stable situation as it had 
before the occurrence of risk [33]. Facing risk, a 
robust supply chain is able to cope with it so that the 
negative impact of risk will cause very little harm to 
the supply chain operation. In contrary to robustness, 
resilience is referred to ability of supply chain to 
return to a new stable or desirable situation after the 
impact of risk [33]. A resilient supply chain is able to 
adapt to the new change brought by risks very 
quickly and then operate in a stable manner again. In 
this study, our interest is in measuring the resilience 
of supply chain using the model of SCRS. 
In the model of SCRS, risk node has two states: 
one is “healthy”, indicating that the risk is inactive 
and not triggered; the other is “infected”, indicating 
that the risk is active and has been triggered by some 
factors or other risks. At each time point t, the 
healthy risk node is possible to be infected, which is 
subjected to its probability to be triggered. If its 
antecedent risk nodes are not infected, it will be 
triggered by its marginal probability; but if some of 
its antecedent risk nodes have be infected, it will be 
trigged by its conditional probability which will be 
much higher than its marginal probability. In case 
that some risk nodes have been infected already, the 
supply chain companies concerned will take actions, 
trying their best to recover the risk nodes back to the 
healthy state. The attempt may succeed or fail, 
subjected to the recovery rate which measures how 
likely a risk node can be restored from a chaos back 
to normality. Generally, the higher the recovery rate 
is, the more quickly the risk node is able to return to 
health. Given that, the recovery rate in SCRS can be 
a good indicator to measure the resilience of supply 
chain. 
In fact, the improvement of the recovery rate 
comes at cost. It requires supply chain companies to 
devote significant investment in risk analysis and the 
development of mitigation approach. However, in 
reality few companies are able to afford such huge 
investment in SCRM whereas they know that it is 
truly crucial for them to maintain an acceptable level 
of the recovery rate otherwise the business may 
suffer huge loss. In SCRS, we are aware that there 
must exist a minimum threshold for the recovery rate. 
If the recovery rate fails to catch up with the 
threshold value, there will be a persistent chaos in the 
supply chain in which the healthy risk nodes will be 
trigged by conditional probability rather than 
marginal probability. Under this circumstance, the 
chain effect of risk infection will continue and never 
die out because the recovery rate is too low to 
suppress the spawning chaos. If this were the case, it 
would be a catastrophe to the whole supply chain. 
Below, we would like to use an analytical model 
based on SCRS to analyze the recovery rate and try 
to deduce the threshold value through mathematical 
inference. 
The model setting is as follows: There are n risk 
nodes in the SCRS. We define the probability pi(t) by 
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which risk node i is triggered at time t, as a result of 
infection by its antecedent infected nodes at time (t-
1). Suppose that j=1,2,…,k are the antecedent nodes 
of node i. Δ is the average recovery rate of the supply 
chain. Γ is the triggered rate matrix of n× n, defined 
as below: 
 
Γ =
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
nnnn
n
n
γγγ
γγγ
γγγ
...
............
...
...
21
22221
11211
d
=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
nnnn
n
n
ppp
ppp
ppp
...
............
...
...
21
22221
1121
 
Where pi is the marginal probability of risk node i, 
and pij is the conditional probability given that node j 
is infected. pij is positively associated with corrij (See 
Formula(1).) It is said that given other condition 
unchanged, in case that the correlation between node 
i and j is stronger, if node j is infected, then the 
probability of node i to be triggered will be higher. 
ijγ is the triggered rate of risk node i given that node 
j is infected, therefore 
⎩⎨
⎧
=
≠
=
jip
jip
ij
i
ijγ  
If risk node i is not infected at time (t-1), then the 
probability of infection at time t is the sum of 
probabilities of being triggered by the k antecedent 
nodes. By definition, the probability that node i is not 
infected at (t-1) is )]1(1[ −− tpi , and then the 
probability of being triggered by antecedent nodes 
is∑ −k
j
jij tp )1(γ . So probability of being trigged 
from neighbors is  
∑ −−− k
j
jiji tptp )1()]1(1[ γ  
If node i is already infected at time (t-1), then the 
probability that it will remain infected at time t is the 
joint probability that it was triggered at time (t-1) and 
the probability that it does not recover. So the 
probability of non-recovery when already inflected is 
)1()1( −Δ− tpi  
Therefore, summing the two events yields the 
probability that node i is at the infected state at time t 
(including the case of being triggered and the case of 
remaining inflected ): 
)(tpi = )1()1()1()]1(1[ −Δ−+−−− ∑ tptptp iik
j
jiji γ  
Where i=1,2,…,n 
 
Put it into matrix form, we can get 
)(tP = )1()1()1()]1(1[ −Δ−+−Γ−− tPtPtpi   
= )1(})1()]1(1{[ −Δ−+Γ−− tPItpi …... (2) 
Where i=1,2,…,n, and )(tp is a column vector 
T
n tptptp )](),...,(),([ 21  
 
Formula (2) shows in an elegant form of 
dynamical system with Markova chain property. The 
state equation is ideal except for the term 
)]1(1[ −− tpi , which does not fit nicely into the 
matrix formulation. Given that, we would like to 
assume )1( −tpi is rather small and such that 
1)1(1 ≈−− tpi . Then,  
)(tP ≈ )1(])1([ −Δ−+Γ tPI  ……………(3) 
 
Under SCRS, the assumption above is 
reasonable. Normally speaking, the probability that a 
risk happens is relatively very small. Even given that 
some antecedent risks have been triggered, the 
conditional probability will be much higher than the 
original marginal probability but it in most occasions 
is still very small. Given that, assuming )1( −tpi ≈ 0 
may not lead to great accuracy loss in )(tP , and 
formula (3) will be a good approximation in 
calculating )(tP . 
Let ])1([ IΔ−+Γ be S, called the system matrix, 
we can obtain the first order difference equation: 
)(tP = )1( −⋅ tPS …………………..(4) 
When )0(P is given 
)(tP = )0(PS t  …………………......(5) 
We define )(Sρ as the largest nontrivial 
eigenvalue of system matrix S and )(Γρ  as the 
largest nontrivial eigenvalue of triggered rate 
matrix Γ . )(Sρ  and )(Γρ can be shown to have the 
following relationship1: 
)(Sρ = )1()( Δ−+Γρ ……………(6) 
 
Formula (5) and (6) convey a message that 
SCRS is a convergent system if )(Sρ <1, or 
equivalently, if Δ  is at least larger than )(Γρ . 
Supposing supply chain is in a chaos state )0(P at 
time t=0, with time passes by, if the recovery 
rate Δ > )(Γρ , )(tP will converge and return to a 
stable or normal state that each risk node in SCRS is 
                                                 
1 Due to the space limit, the proof is omitted. The readers 
can contact the authors for the detail of the proof if they are 
interested in it. 
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triggered by its marginal probability. The convergent 
speed reflects the resilience of supply chain, which is 
subjected to the recovery rate Δ  given )(Γρ  
unchanged. The SCRS can quickly return to 
normality if the recovery rate Δ is very high. But if 
Δ < )(Γρ , the chaos will persist in the supply chain, 
in which most of risk nodes in SCRS are triggered by 
its conditional probability. Hence, risk will happen by 
much higher chance, and accidental events will 
continuously break out anywhere in the supply chain, 
probably able to result in long-term disruption in 
operation and tremendous loss in finance. To prevent 
such disaster, Δ should at least maintain at the level 
of )(Γρ , and *Δ = )(Γρ is the minimum threshold 
for the recovery rate. 
 
3.4. Supply chain resilience and partnership 
 
The threshold value of the recovery rate *Δ is 
equal to the largest nontrivial eigenvalue of triggered 
rate matrix Γ . It is associated with the topological 
structure of SCRS. The topological structure is 
concerned with the problems such as how the risk 
nodes are distributed and in which patterns they are 
organized. In terms of the orderliness and regularity, 
there exist two typical types of structures: random 
graph and scale-free network. Random graph is 
referred to the system in which its components are 
organized randomly, and there is no pattern able to be 
recognized regarding its topological structure [34]. 
Scale-free network is referred to the system in which 
small portion of its components are with high degree 
of connections with other components but most of its 
components are with low degree of connections with 
other components, and this regulation holds 
regardless the scale of the system [26, 34]. The 
rationale behind is that each time when a new node 
enter into the network, it will first choose the node 
with highest degree of connections to connect with, 
in other words, the node with higher degree of 
connections gets higher chance to be connected with, 
and the node with lower degree of connections gets 
lower chance to be connected with. Therefore, it will 
result in such scale-free system.   
With dramatic growth of partnership in supply 
chain, companies are inclined to closely collaborate 
with each other. They enjoy being engaged in joint 
activities in which companies cooperate together to 
accomplish certain operations. Such joint activities 
may be associated with lots of other operations, thus 
capable to influence the supply chain in a wide extent. 
If problems happen in those activities, it may harm 
the supply chain greatly. In SCRS, the risk hidden in 
joint activities is named as collaboration risks, and 
the collaboration risks normally are the risk nodes 
with high degree of connections. Therefore, when 
partnership goes deep, partners will collaborate more 
frequently and they may choose co-working in form 
of joint activities rather than working individually. 
Hence, that will result in more collaboration risks in 
supply chain. Such change reflected in SCRS in 
terms of topological structure is a process of 
transformation from random graph to scale-free 
network (See Fig.4). 
 
        Fig 4 Effect of Partnership on Topological Structure of SCRS 
 
A fact has been revealed by system science that 
scale-free network is a more organized system 
compared to random graph [34]. Given that, 
theoretically speaking, )(Γρ of a scale-free network 
should be less than the one of random graph. Thus, 
*Δ for scale-free network is less than the one for 
random graph. In other words, partnership makes the 
SCRS evolve towards a more organized and regular 
system, and then lowers the minimum threshold *Δ  
required for the recovery rate.  Moreover, referred to 
formula (6) )(Sρ = )1()( Δ−+Γρ , when )(Γρ  
decreases,  )(Sρ  will drop from 1 to 0 given that 
Δ > )(Γρ . It implies that the decrease of )(Γρ  is 
able to speed up SCRS from chaos to normality. 
Thereby )(Γρ is negatively associated with the 
resilience of supply chain. The effect of partnership 
upon SCRS reflects in reducing )(Γρ and making the 
system inclined towards a more organized structure. 
Hence, partners’ collaboration contributes to the 
resilience of supply chain. Through partnership and 
collaboration, supply chain can recover from chaos or 
disruption more quickly.  
 
4. Verification experiments 
 
In the previous section, two conclusions have 
been drawn theoretically: 
1. There exists a minimum threshold value *Δ that 
prevents the SCRS from persistent chaos, 
and *Δ = )(Γρ  
2. Partnership makes the SCRS more inclined to 
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evolve towards scare-free network, a more 
organized and regular system compared to 
random graph, and such impact benefits the 
resilience of supply chain by reducing )(Γρ and 
lower *Δ . 
 
These two findings are mainly relied on 
analytical inference in theory, and thus lack empirical 
evidence to manifest their correctness. Given that, in 
this paper, simulation is employed as the verification 
method to test the conclusions mentioned above. As a 
matter of fact, simulation is the only feasible choice 
under the rigorous research requirement of this study. 
First, it is too difficult to collect empirical data in the 
industry. Despite that risk management has been 
studied for more than 15 years, few companies have 
the records of risk data in their database [35]. 
Moreover, the research target is on supply chain 
which involves multiple companies. Obtaining 
consistent historical data across companies is 
extremely difficult. Furthermore, the key research 
scenario is fixed on a supply chain from chaos back 
to normality. It is only simulation that can construct 
such a specific scenario that the research interest is 
able to be satisfied. 
 
4.1. Design of experiments 
 
A simulation program has been developed to 
implement the attributes and behaviors of the model 
of SCRS. Fig.5 shows a snapshot of this system. 
 
 
Fig 5 Snapshoot of SCRS Simulation program 
 
With the help of this simulation program, 
researchers can construct the scenarios they are really 
interested and conduct the experiments following 
their research plan. In this paper, two set of 
experiments are designed to test the conclusions 
drawn analytically using the model of SCRS. The 
first set of experiments is named threshold tests, 
which are intended to verify that *Δ = )(Γρ through 
simulation. The experiments involve 4 key steps: 
Step1 is to construct a SCRS with reasonable setting. 
In this step, a SCRS is built by applying a real 
scenario in business. The risk nodes and their casual 
relationships are suggested by 4 experts in the field of 
SCRM. The marginal probability and conditional 
probability, due to the need for large data, are 
generated using the computer algorithm. Suggested 
by the literature, a small probability should below 0.3 
[26]. Given that, for marginal probability, it is 
generated uniformly within the interval of (0, 0.2), 
and conditional probability is generated within the 
interval of (marginal probability, 0.3) since 
conditional probability must be larger than the 
marginal one. Under this network setting, we can 
obtain the value of )(Γρ by calculating the largest 
eigenvalue of Γ matrix. According to Frobenis-
Perron theorem, it is assured that a positive value 
of )(Γρ can be obtained because for a positive square 
matrix there must be at least one positive real 
eigenvalue. Step2 is to record the normal state of 
SCRS. Through simulation, we are allowed to imitate 
the process in which the SCRS is operating in a 
normal state. During the process, the program would 
record down the number of the triggered nodes at 
each time t and store the data into a database. For 
each time t, it is called a run. For each experiment, 
the process would be simulated for 2000 runs in order 
to capture a comprehensive data of normal state of 
SCRS. Step3 is to simulate the process of SCRS from 
chaos to normality and obtain *Δ in this recovery 
process. In this step the first task is to simulate the 
chaos state of SCRS. The chaos state is referred to a 
situation in which the risk network is overwhelming 
by risk events and nearly all risk nodes are triggered 
by conditional probability. Then in a chaos state, by 
assigning different recovery rates, we would find out 
the minimum one that is able to recover the SCRS 
from chaos to normality. To judge whether the SCRS 
has already returned to normality, we compare the 
current state with the normal state that has been 
obtained in step 2. By using two-sample T test, if the 
P-values of T statistic and F statistic both exceed 0.05, 
we can confirm that the SCRS has returned from 
chaos to normality. Step4 is to examine the 
correlation between *Δ and )(Γρ . In this step we 
would like to check the relationship between *Δ  and 
)(Γρ , and see if they are strongly correlated as 
predicted in the analytical model. 
The second set of experiments is named 
topological experiments. They are through simulation 
to test whether *Δ of a scale-free network is actually 
Proceedings of the 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2011
8
lower than *Δ  of a random graph system. The most 
difficult part in these experiments is to generate the 
SCRS with topological structure of scale-free or 
random graph. For scale-free network, Barabasi-
Albert (BA) approach is chosen as the network 
generating algorism while for random graph, Erdos-
Renyi (ER) approach is used to construct the network. 
To make these two types of network comparable, the 
simulation program by default generates the same 
amount risk nodes with constant marginal probability 
of 0.1 and constant conditional probability of 0.15, 
and the same amount of links within the SCRS also. 
 
4.2. Experimental results and discussion 
 
The thresholds tests consist of 4 business 
scenarios pervasively existing in supply chain and 
each scenario includes 20 experiments. The final 
experimental results are summarized in Fig.6: 
 
 
Fig 6 Regression Statistics in Threshold Tests 
 
The statics of regression analysis manifest that 
there is a strong correlation between *Δ  and )(Γρ . 
The simulation results confirm the inference derived 
from the analytical model that *Δ is equal 
to )(Γρ .Through extensive experiments, it is able to 
reach a conclusion that *Δ the threshold value of 
recovery rate is highly correlated with )(Γρ and their 
correlation is approaching nearly 1, and this provides 
strong supporting evidence to bolster the argument 
that *Δ = )(Γρ , which has been shown theoretically.  
 
The topological experiments in all contain 10 
experiments. They are contrasting *Δ of SCRS in 
scale-free and random graph. TABLE 2 briefly shows 
the summary of the experimental results. 
TABLE 2 
     Summary of Threshold of Recovery Rate in Topological Tests 
 
Note: N: number of risk nodes; L: number of links 
TABLE2 uncovers a fact that *Δ  of a scale-free 
network is always smaller than the one of a random 
graph. It indicates that the threshold of the recovery 
rate reduces when the SCRS evolves towards a more 
organized and regular network. The effect of 
partnership will make supply chain more inclined to 
transform from random graph to scale-free. Such 
change in topological structure can significantly 
contribute to the resilience of supply chain. It can 
reduce the minimum threshold required to prevent 
chaos from persisting in supply chain, and it also can 
speed up the recovery process for a risk node from 
chaos to normality. In a word, partnership does make 
positive influence on the management of supply 
chain risks. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Supply chain risk management is a principle 
component in the body of supply chain management 
research. Previous studies mostly focusing on 
specific type of risk paid little attention upon the 
internal correlation existing among the risks in supply 
chain. This study re-conceptualizes supply chain risks 
into a general form and proposes a model through 
which risks can be integrated into a supply chain risk 
system (SCRS) capable to reflect not only the mutual 
correlation but also the causal relationship among 
them. Through modeling and simulation, it is 
revealed that the partnership can significantly 
contribute to the resilience of supply chain and 
benefit the risk management in supply chain. This 
offers a novel view from the perspective of risk 
management to explain why more and more supply 
chain companies are consciously engaged in 
partnership nowadays. It is hoped that this study 
would inspire practitioners and help them to form a 
new perception regarding the relationship between 
partnership and supply chain risk management. 
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